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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
converted to cash by the debtor. This is perfectly sound because
the basis of the interruption is the acknowledgment by the
debtor and not the receipt of cash by the creditor.
In Klotz v. Nola Cabs,41 a taxi struck a parked police car, in-
juring the policeman and damaging the vehicle. A suit was
timely filed for the personal injuries; and on the date set for
trial, more than one year later, the City of New Orleans inter-
vened to claim recovery for the damages to their car. The court
held that the city's claim had been prescribed by one year, and
the policeman's suit for personal injury did not constitute an
interruption in favor of the city's claim because this was a
totally different cause of action for property damage.
Informality in Auction Sale
It should be noted that the jurisprudence has added a con-
dition to Civil Code Article 3543, which provides the two-year
prescription to cure defects in judicial sales, in limiting the bene-
fit of this plea to purchasers in good faith.
42
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Use
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. O'Bierl is an addition to
the rules of use applicable to mineral servitudes. Production of
gas was obtained from the servitude tract in question and was
continued for a period of sixteen years, at which time the pipe-
line connections were removed and the well capped. Two events
were relied upon by the servitude owners as constituting inter-
ruptions of prescription. First, the landowner, who also had an
interest in the minerals, continued to use gas to supply his
residence even after the well was shut in because it was no
longer capable of production in paying quantities. Second, for
a number of years, the lessee of the tract paid or offered to pay
shut-in royalties to those entitled to share in them, including
both the servitude owners and the landowner.
41, 209 So.2d 158 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
42. Middle Tennessee Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Ford, 205 So.2d 867,
877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), citing Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So.2d 855 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 201 So.2d 280 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
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Dealing first with the question of the effect of use of gas
for residential purposes by the landowner, the court adverted
to Articles 793 and 794 of the Civil Code, noting that the latter
requires that the servitude be used "as appertaining to the
estate." Analogizing this to the situation of a mineral servitude,
the court held that the use of gas by the landowner was not "by
or on behalf or in the interest of the owner" of the servitude,
an element required by the public policy inherent in the rules
of use applied to mineral servitudes. Buttressing this conclu-
sion, the court cites the opinion of the Supreme Court in Union
Oil Co. of California v. Touchet, in which it was held that "it is
a firmly entrenched principle of Louisiana mineral law that no
act on the part of a landowner will have the effect of extending
the life of a mineral interest unless it is shown that there was
a clear intention on the part of the landowner to achieve that
very result."'2
There is but one questionable note in the discussion of this
particular issue in the subject opinion. Citing Mays v. Hansbro,3
which had held that production in paying quantities is not nec-
essary to maintain a mineral servitude, the court stated that "to
hold that the use of a small amount of gas for the service of
one dwelling constituted production from a well which had been
capped and from which all pipeline connections had been re-
moved, would require such a strained and unreasonable inter-
pretation as would not only violate the rules of reason and com-
mon sense but also the intent and purpose of considerations of
public policy."'4
In this writer's opinion, the determinative factor in this case
is that the production for residential consumption was by the
landowner, not the servitude owner. Had it been the mineral
servitude owner's dwelling and gas consumption, a literal read-
ing of Mays v. Hansbro5 would require a holding that prescrip-
tion had been interrupted. There the court stated only that it
"is unimportant whether this production was in paying quanti-
ties so long as there was some production or use of the servi-
tude."' 6 Since the residential consumption of gas is a beneficial
economic use of the minerals, it seems that had the production
been by or on behalf of the servitude owner, a different result
2. 229 La. 316, 331, 86 So.2d 50, 55 (1956).
3. 222 La. 957, 64 So.2d 232 (1953).
4. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. O'Bier, 201 So.2d 280, 285 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1967).
5. 222 La. 957. 64 So.2d 232 (1953).
6. Id. at 961, 64 So.2d at 234.
239
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
might have been reached in the instant case. A different rule
would place the courts in the difficult position of having to draw
lines as to how many barrels of oil or cubic feet of gas would be
necessary to constitute use, a task involving the drawing of
highly arbitrary lines.
The second significant issue in the case was whether the
making of shut-in payments on a well no longer capable of pro-
duction in paying quantities would constitute an interruption,
or perhaps preferably a suspension, of prescription. The servi-
tude owners relied on certain prior decisions indicating that the
presence of a shut-in well capable of producing in paying quanti-
ties on a mineral royalty tract will have an effect on prescrip-
tion. In those decisions, however, the facts that the leases in
question had included provision for shut-in royalties and such
royalties that had been paid lent plausibility to the argument
by the servitude owners.
After noting that the case before the court involved a servi-
tude rather than a royalty, a distinction which should not be
deemed meaningful in this context, the court went on to state
that it was "not aware of any authority to the effect that the
payment of a shut-in royalty, of and by itself, constitutes the
exercise of a mineral servitude. The determinant factor appears
to relate to the cause which influences the shutting in of the
well. If the cause is attributable to circumstances beyond the
control of the owner of the servitude, for example, the want of
a market, or the lack of pipeline transportation facilities, our
courts have held that the running of prescription is suspended,
although the period of time during which such a cause would
be considered as justifying this conclusion has not been deter-
mined, possibly because no fixed rule in this respect would be
available."7
Applying this principle to the facts of the case at bar, the
court noted that the well was not one capable of production in
paying quantities and was not shut-in for lack of a market or
marketing facilities, but that it was shut-in because it could no
longer produce in paying quantities. Thus, its presence on the
premises could have no effect on prescription.
This writer has previously observed that the making of shut-
in payments should not be the determining factor in deciding
whether a shut-in well should have an impact on prescription.
7. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. O'Bier, 201 So.2d 280, 285 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1967).
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It is the presence of a shut-in well shown by surface production
to be capable of producing in paying quantities which is deter-
minative. Whether a particular lease includes provisions for
shut-in royalties and whether such payments are made is
irrelevant.
One further note should be taken of this decision. The court
interprets the prior decisions in this area" as holding that the
presence of a shut-in well "suspends" prescription. This is not
correct, as the courts have in fact labeled the effect an "inter-
ruption." However, no case to date has squarely presented the
issue, requiring characterization of the effect on prescription
wrought by a shut-in well. To be sure, the characterization of
this effect as a suspension is preferable to calling it an inter-
ruption because the effect stems from existence of a condition
which does not permit an interruption of prescription by use.
There is no production, thus no use. Still there is an effect on
prescription which should be termed a suspension. The exis-
tence of a shut-in clause and the making of payments under it
might in some instances permit courts to say that there is con-
structive production as contemplated by the lease, but not all
leases are structured so that shut-in payments constitute con-
structive production. Moreover, as noted, it is the presence of
a well capable of production in paying quantities, not the mak-
ing of shut-in payments, which is the vital condition.
Contractual Variation of Rules of Prescription
Lebleu v. Lebleu" raised questions concerning the extent to
which parties are free to vary the rules of prescription by con-
tract. Plaintiffs were owners of a mineral servitude burdening
defendant's land. During the fifth year in the life of the servi-
tude, plaintiffs executed instruments with defendant under the
terms of which they: (1) appointed defendant as their agent,
granting full executive rights over their mineral servitude;
(2) conveyed or released a portion of their mineral rights to
defendant; and (3) received from defendant a promise that if
8. Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 94 So.2d 281 (1957) ; LeBlanc v. Haynes-
ville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 289, 88 So.2d 377 (1956) ; Union Oil Co. of California
v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956) ; Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V.S.&P. R.R.,
222 La. 383, 62 So.2d 615 (1952) ; Lee v. Goodwin, 174 So.2d 651 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1965), writs denied, 248 La. 149, 177 So.2d 118. Of these prior cases only the
LeBlanc and Lee decisions were actually cited by the court of appeal in the opinion
under discussion. However, the remainder are relevant. For a discussion of these
cases, and specifically the question of whether the impact on prescription is one
of interruption or suspension, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 19611-1965 Term-Mineral Rights, 26 LA. L. REv. 542, 556 (1966).
9. 206 So.2d 551 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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their outstanding mineral interest expired at the end of the
prescriptive period then accruing, defendant would convey to
them a one-fourth mineral interest, a larger mineral interest
than they then held. Plaintiffs' interest did in fact expire. Upon
defendant's refusal to perform, plaintiffs sued for specific per-
formance of the contract obligating defendant to convey the one-
fourth mineral interest. Alternatively, plaintiffs sought an ac-
counting for the bonuses and rentals attributable to the minerals
which they had conveyed or released to defendant. In the fur-
ther alternative, plaintiffs sought judgment decreeing that the
instruments executed by them and by defendant had wrought
an interruption of prescription by acknowledgment.
There was no basis for sustaining the second alternative
argument that the instruments in question constituted an ac-
knowledgment. The lower court granted the accounting sought
in the first alternative demand and defendants did not appeal
from that judgment. Thus, on denial of the primary demand for
specific performance, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal af-
firmed the judgment of the lower court.
The primary demand for specific performance was denied
on the ground that the court thought "the parties to this suit,
in entering into the agreement which is evidenced by the three
written documents hereinabove described, intended to vest plain-
tiffs with a mineral servitude extending over a period of at least
15 years from and after the date on which the contracts were
entered into." 10 This result was reached in reliance on Ober v.
McGinty" and other authorities 12 and on the principle of the
Civil Code that one cannot renounce the benefit of prescription
not yet accrued.'8 Although the court purported to distinguish
the decision rendered in Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer
Timber Co.,14 the distinction drawn is not satisfactory, and the
decision is erroneous.
The obvious key to the court's attitude, which is understand-
able, lies in the firmly established policy that mineral servitudes
cannot be created without being subject to the ten-year pre-
10. Id. at 557.
11. 66 So.2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
12. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954) ; Roy 0. Martin Lumber
Co. v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co., 190 La. 84, 181 So. 865 (1938) ; Childs v. Porter-
Wadley Lumber Co., 190 La. 308, 182 So. 516 (1938) ; Patton's Heirs v. Moseley,
186 La. 1088, 173 So. 772 (1937) Ober v. McGinty, 66 So.2d 385 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1953).
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3460.
14. 131 So.2d 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). The court also distinguished the
Supreme Court decision in Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So.2d 219 (1948).
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scription of nonuse and the corollary principle that parties may
not deal in reversionary rights to mineral servitudes or mineral
royalties. Analysis of the Lebleu decision is facilitated by hold-
ing it up for examination in the light of these two principles.
Treating the question of whether this was an attempt to
create a servitude for a period greater than ten years, several
criticisms of the decision can be made. First, the decision ren-
dered in Ober v. McGinty, 5 upon which the court placed major
reliance, is distinguishable. In that instance the parties at the
time of creation of a mineral servitude attempted to give the
servitude owner the right to renew that particular servitude if
ten years should pass without interruption of prescription by
use. The contract was clearly violative of the prohibition against
renunciation of unaccrued prescription. But the basic reason for
that prohibition insofar as mineral law is concerned is that it
is deemed undesirable to permit one owner of land to burden
future owners of the land with mineral interests not subject to
the rules of prescription. The court need not have struck down
the Lebleu contract, for it presented no such danger. In return
for a present benefit-a larger share of the mineral rights and
executive rights over plaintiffs' remaining share of the min-
erals-defendant made a promise to convey a different, larger
mineral servitude to plaintiffs if a certain condition occurred,
that is, if their then outstanding rights expired. No real right
was created by the contract. The life of the existing mineral
servitude was not in any way affected, and the accrual of pre-
scription against it continued in the manner contemplated by
law. No future owner of the land in question could have been
held to defendant's personal promise to convey mineral rights
on occurrence of a future condition as the contract did not cre-
ate any real right which could have bound a subsequent owner
of the estate. Presumably the court would have had little diffi-
culty enforcing a contract by which defendant promised to con-
vey mineral rights to plaintiffs if on a date certain the value
of certain stocks reached a particular figure. There is no es-
sential difference between that contract and the one in ques-
tion. The problem is that the consideration given by plaintiffs
and the promise given by defendant centered on a condition in-
volving the life of an existing mineral servitude. The situation
punched an emotional key producing a reaction in terms of public
policy which hard analysis should have avoided.
15. 66 So.2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
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To shore up this analysis, examination of the decision dis-
regarded by the court, Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Tim-
ber Co.,16 lends support. There, the parties entered into a lease
of land by which the lessee received the right to make all surface
uses of the premises together with an option to purchase five
years from the date of the contract and to apply the rental pay-
ments to the purchase price. The stated terms according to
which the sale could take place included reservation of mineral
rights by the lessor-vendor. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal
denied an exception of no cause of action in the face of an
express allegation that the parties entered into the agreement
with the intent of circumventing the public policy against cre-
ation of mineral servitudes without having them subject to the
rules of prescription. The court rested its decision on the prin-
ciple that the lease contract did not create any mineral servi-
tude, but merely granted an option. As there was no mineral
servitude created, it could not be said that prescription began to
run, and the public policy was not avoided.
In the Lebleu case, no mineral interest was created. The ac-
crual of prescription against the then existing interest was not
affected. There was a clear exchange of equivalents in the grant-
ing of the executive rights and the mineral rights by plaintiffs
in return for defendant's personal promise to convey a new and
different interest if the then existing rights expired. And, most
importantly, no future owner of the land could have been bound
by defendant's promise as no real rights were created as a result
of his giving it.
The second problem in this case is found in the possibility
that it might be a prohibited circumvention of the rule of Hicks
v. Clark" against dealing in reversionary interests. Here again,
however, the significant distinction lies in the fact that the land-
owner, defendant, did not attempt to create any real right
which could burden any subsequent owner of the property. All
that was given was a personal promise to convey. To require
performance of that promise two conditions had to exist. De-
fendant would have to be owner of the land and the outstanding
interest would have to expire. If any other person became owner
of the land, plaintiffs could not have enforced defendant's pro-
mise. That such personal contracts are not reprobated by the
public policy underlying the rules of prescription is suggested
16. 131 So.2d 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
17. 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
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by the decision in McDonald v. Richard18 and other cases in which
the court indicates that the after-acquired title doctrine is ap-
plicable to mineral rights. Two observations draw a close parallel
to the instant case. First, for the after-acquired title doctrine
to become operative the over-seller must be owner of the land
at the time the previously outstanding mineral rights expire.
Second, the after-acquired title doctrine is essentially an enforce-
ment of the vendor's implied warranty of title by operation of
law.1" In the Lebleu case, the defendant would have had to re-
main owner of the land and the promise given was personal, not
creative of real rights. As a further indication that the Lebleu
contract was valid, the record in McDonald v. Richard20 reveals
that both vendor and vendee knew at the time of the over-sale
that all of the mineral rights were outstanding. Still, the court
indicated that but for the fact that the vendor did not remain
owner of the land at the time of reversion of the previously out-
standing mineral rights, the after-acquired title doctrine would
have been applicable. Thus, it appears that if the parties could
have effected the intended, or at least a similar, result of the
contracts involved in the Lebleu case by an oversale and reliance
on the after-acquired title doctrine, there is no reason to in-
validate the contract into which they entered.
All things considered, then, the Lebleu decision is in error
for the basic reason that the agreement did not violate the public
policy against burdening land with mineral interests with a
prescriptive period greater than ten years.
Partition
In Barnes v. Perkins21 plaintiff instituted suit seeking parti-
tion of a tract of land. Partition by licitation was ordered, and
following the sale a notary was appointed to disburse the
proceeds. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the proposed distribu-
tion, but the trial court refused to sustain plaintiff's opposition.
Plaintiff owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the land.
However, the minerals attributable to this interest in the land
were owned by the State of Louisiana. The remaining mineral
18. 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943). See also Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La.
479, 59 So.2d 693 (1952) ; White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942). The
doctrinal base for the decision in White v. Hodges is unclear in view of the later
decision in McDonald v. Richard. However, the indications that the after-acquired
title doctrine is applicable to mineral rights are substantial and clear.
19. For a discussion of the entire doctrine of after-acquired title as applicable
to mineral interests in Louisiana see Comment, The After-Acquired Title Doctrine
in Louisiana Mineral Law, 27 LA. L. REV. 576 (1967).
20. 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943).
21. 201 So.2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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rights were owned by the other two co-owners. The appraisal
of the property had been made on the basis of $400 per acre for
the property including the mineral rights and $75.00 per acre
as a separate value of the mineral rights. In the judgment or-
dering the sale, the lower court specifically recognized that the
state owned one-fourth of the mineral rights and decreed that the
sale would not include that interest. At the sale, the property was
bid in by the defendant co-owners, who deposited one-fourth of
the amount of the bid with the sheriff and retained the remain-
ing three-fourths. The deposit was made with the specific
reservation that "all rights are reserved relative allocation of
the adjudication price to surface and mineral interest owner-
ship." The notary appointed to disburse the funds proposed to
disburse the funds on a proportionate basis using the relative
values between the parties' interests in the property and the ap-
praisal figures. Thus, plaintiff's share was computed by finding
the percentage of the total appraised value represented by his
one-fourth interest, or ten acres, valued at $325.00. That per-
centage figure was used to find his share of the purchase price,
which was slightly more than the total appraised value of the
land and the three-fourths of the mineral rights available for
sale. The remainder of the deposit was returned to defendants
less their proportionate share of costs.
Plaintiff objected and demanded that judgment be rendered
nullifying the sale and ordering a new sale. The principal ground
for the objection was that the purchasers had not submitted a
separate bid for minerals and that there was no evidence as to
the amount bid for land and that bid for minerals. On appeal,
plaintiff contended that he should be entitled to the full one-
fourth of the net proceeds of the sale or alternatively that the
sale should be annulled and a new sale had.
The demand for annullment of the sale was denied. The court
held that the judgment directing the partition by licitation was
a final judgment and that the delays for taking either a suspen-
sive or devolutive appeal had elapsed. The objection by plaintiff
insofar as it objected to the sale itself, was regarded as "in part
an attempt to collaterally attack the original judgment which has
become final."
The demand that plaintiff be given the full one-fourth in-
terest in the net proceeds less costs, was also denied. Responding
to specific arguments by the plaintiff, the court held that: (a)
the appraisers had been requested to value the minerals separate-
[Vol. XXIX
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ly from the land; (b) that the appraisers were qualified to value
the mineral rights; (c) that the fact that separate bids were
not submitted for the mineral rights and the land was of no
significance in view of the fact that the minerals were in fact
separately valued as required by the Civil Code; and (d) under
the circumstances defendants were not required to show that a
specific portion of the purchase price was paid for mineral rights
as distinguished from the land.
Two points deserve brief notation. The first is the holding
that under Article 741 it is not necessary that separate bids be
submitted for land as opposed for mineral rights so long as
separate appraisals have been made. The result reached by the
court may represent substantial justice and certainly avoided
repetition of the sale procedure in this particular case. However,
the procedure of requiring separate bids or at least assignment
of relative values would be preferable to that utilized and upheld
in this particular case as bidders might assign values to land
and minerals respectively different from the proportionate values
fixed by an appraiser.
The second observation concerns the holding that defendants
were not required to show that a specific portion of the purchase
price was paid for the mineral rights as distinguished from the
land. In view of the court's holding that separate bids were not
necessary and that distribution could be made on the basis of
proportionate values according to the appraisal values of the
land and minerals, this is a necessary consequential holding.
Nevertheless, the same defect is inherent in this holding as in
the holding that disbursement of the proceeds could be made on the
basis of the proportionate values found by the appraisers. That is,
a bidder might not in fact be assigning the same relative values to
land and minerals as did the appraisers. If the defendant in a case
of this kind does not bear the burden of proving the values as-
signed to land and minerals, then this leaves room for inference
that it is the plaintiff's burden. How a plaintiff can look into
the mind of a bidder at a sale of this kind and find the relative
values fixed for land and minerals in a lump sum bid without
any likelihood of circumstantial evidence disclosing such values
is difficult to discern.
These two elements of the court's decision point up the ques-
tionable character of the rules of law evolved and applied by the
court. Certainly, if the decision is allowed to stand, it still re-
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mains evident that a procedure of assigning relative values in
bidding will permit more accurate distribution of proceeds.
MINERAL ROYALTIES
The only noteworthy decision involving royalties was ren-
dered in Gardner v. Boagni,22 which raises the whole question
of the relationship between owners of land and mineral rights
or the owners of mineral servitudes and the owners of mineral
royalties, or non-participating royalty interests as they are re-
ferred to in other jurisdictions. This decision is the touchstone
of a student comment presently being written, and for that
reason extended discussion will be foregone. Still, the writer
wishes to express the view that the trend of jurisprudence es-
tablished by this case and the earlier decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeal in Uzee v. Bollinger2 3 is demonstrably wrong and
makes Louisiana virtually unique among oil and gas jurisdic-
tions.2
The specific situation involved a partition agreement under
which those owning the mineral rights were expressly stated to
have the right to all bonuses, rentals, and other considerations
(except royalties) from execution of mineral leases on the subject
property and the royalty owners had the right to a stated frac-
tion of all royalties. In negotiating a lease, the mineral owners
received an overriding royalty interest which all parties ad-
mitted was in lieu of an offer of a substantial cash bonus. There
can be no doubt, of course, that the cash bonus would have been
entirely the property of the mineral owners had it been ac-
cepted. However, the override was taken and the mineral owners
refused to share it on the ground that it was "bonus." In this
writer's opinion it is unconscionable for the law to present op-
portunities for unfair dealing by such subtle and functionally
meaningless manipulation of words. It is true that there are
decisions stating that the royalty owner has no right to expect the
mineral owner to act in his behalf in order to preserve his in-
terest against prescription.2 5 The logic of this principle is ir-
refutable and the concept sound. But to say that under no cir-
cumstances does the mineral owner owe a duty of fair dealing
puts the law in the position of condoning sharp practices. In the
22. 252 La. 30, 209 So.2d 11 (1968).
23. 178 So.2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
24. For a discussion of the subject see generally Williams, The Fiduciary Prin-
ciple in the Law of Oil and Gas, in 13TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS
LAW AND TAXATION (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1962).
25. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182
(1946).
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instant case there was no question of fraud, and fraud is not
usually the problem in cases of this kind. However, there are op-
portunities for unfair dealing falling well short of fraud which
the law should restrict. This is one of them.
Similar problems arise in the case of mineral servitude in-
terests over which a landowner has executive rights. Here the
legal basis for protection of the servitude owner is stronger be-
cause he has relinquished a power over his interest to another,
establishing a relationship of trust in which he has a right to
expect fair dealing by the holder of the power. It is important in
this context to note that the relationship established need not be
regarded as importing the full fiduciary relationship of prin-
cipal and agent, but it imports a duty of fairness much akin to
that already established as owed by a mineral lessee in exercising
a power to pool his lessor's interest with other lands. 26
MINERAL LEASES
Joint Lease
In Fontenot v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,27 plaintiff sought
cancellation of a mineral lease. The facts were that plaintiff had
entered into a lease of a tract which she owned with the owners
of two other tracts in which she had no interest. Lessee com-
pleted a shut-in gas well. Production was achieved in the process
of testing the well, and as the lease did not disclose the manner
in which royalties were to be divided, lessee obtained a letter
from plaintiff stating that she had no interest in the tract on
which the well was situated and did not intend, by joining in
the lease, to communitize or pool her share of the royalties pay-
able with the other lessors.
Cancellation was sought on the ground that the lease was not
a joint or community lease and production from the well located
on one of the tracts in which she had no interest did not maintain
the lease as to her tract. Examining the lease, a standard printed
form, the court found that on its face it appeared to be a joint
or community lease and held that although it might be severable
as between the lessors, so that the sharing of royalties was not
on a community basis, it was nevertheless a joint lease as to the
lessee, and thus the drilling of the well and subsequent produc-
tion from it were sufficient to maintain the lease as to all three
tracts involved. In reaching this result, the court refused to hear
26. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
27. 210 So.2d 340 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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extrinsic evidence purportedly showing the intent of the parties
even though plaintiff pleaded error as to the nature of the con-
tract.
Alternatively, plaintiff argued that if the court considered
the lease to be joint as to the lessee, there was no cause or con-
sideration for her entry into the contract. There is some merit
to this contention. It is difficult to see why a lessor would enter
into a joint lease of his land with tracts belonging to others if he
was not to receive a share of royalties from production from the
other tracts. Since error is one of the bases upon which extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to determine the intent of the parties, 28
it seems that the court could properly have considered the ex-
trinsic evidence bearing on the intent of the parties. In the face
of such a plea, it should not matter that the contract is unam-
biguous.
While the facts of the particular case make the result of the
decision acceptable, the principles of law utilized are subject to
some question. It is to be noted and admitted that there is a dif-
ference between the cases involving "jointness" of a lease as
among lessors, particularly applicable to situations in which there
is question whether by entry into a lease landowner has extended
an outstanding mineral servitude, and those concerning "joint-
ness" as between lessor and lessee, but in view of the plea of
error and the fact that it is difficult to discern what cause a
lessor would have for entering into a joint lease when there is to
be no communitization of royalties, the decision is open to ques-
tion.
Parol Evidence
In Robichaux v. P001,29 the court rejected an attempt to prove
an agreement to transfer certain overriding royalty interests by
parol, stating in the process that R.S. 9:1105, providing that
mineral leases and other contracts affecting them are "classified
as real rights" is substantive as well as procedural. The holding
that an agreement of the kind in question cannot be proved by
parol evidence is clearly in line with a number of prior deci-
sions. 30 The unquestioning reliance on R.S. 9:1105 as being sub-
stantive as well as procedural must, however, be taken with the
customary grain of salt in view of several of the decisions in the
28. See, e.g., Overby v. Beach, 220 La. 77, 55 'So.2d 873 (1951).
29. 209 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
30. Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So.2d 558 (1964) ; Hayes v. Muller, 245
La. 356, 158 So.2d 191 (1963).
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running fight between court and legislature over the meaning of
that statute.31
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Adams 32 an assignee of a working in-
terest attempted to avoid responsibility for paying a production
payment which his assignor had contracted for in acquiring the
working interest from the original lessee. Defendant assignee
contended he was not bound by the production payment as it was
created by an unrecorded instrument. Additionally, objections
were raised to the admission of certain letters which passed
between the parties prior to the execution of the assignment. The
court correctly held that the mere fact that that original agree-
ment creating the production payment in question was unrecorded
did not mean that defendant could not contract in such manner
as to assume the payment. Turning then to the question of
whether the obligation of making the payment had been assumed
by defendant, the court held the letters in question were admis-
sible, even though written prior to the execution of the contract,
to show the intent of the parties to the assignment. Defendant
objected to admission of the letters, citing Article 2276 of the
Civil Code prohibiting admission of parol evidence "against or
beyond what is contained in the acts, [or] on what may have
been said before, or at the time of making them, or since." The
court was well within the law in that it is firmly established that
where a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible
for the purpose of determining the intent of the parties and not
to alter its content. 33
Warranty
Berwick Mud Co. v. Stansbury34 affords an interesting com-
parison with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Adams.5 In this instance, de-
fendant leased property to plaintiff's assignor, purporting to
lease the full mineral interest in the property when in fact there
was an interest owned by her children by inheritance from de-
fendant's husband. Under Gueno v. Medlenka36 defendant could
not execute a lease in her capacity as usufructuary, and she did
not sign as tutrix of her children. Plaintiff, assignee of the
original lessees, discovered the outstanding interest in the chil-
31. See, e.g., Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d
764 (1960) ; Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
32. 209 So.2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
33. See, e.g., Bank of Napoleonville v. Knobloch & Rainold, 144 La. 100, 80
So. 214 (1918).
34. 205 So.2d 147 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
35. 209 So.2d 770 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
36. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
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dren. A lease was taken to cover the children's interest, for which
plaintiff paid. The instrument of assignment specifically sub-
rogated plaintiff to all rights of the assignor in warranty. The
original lease from defendant contained an express warranty of
title. Plaintiff-assignee sued to recover damages in the amount
of the bonus which it had to pay for the lease on the children's
interest. The Third Circuit of Appeal reversed the lower court
and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount of
the bonus.
The court held that under the terms of the assignment and
under Article 2503 of the Civil Code plaintiff was subrogated to
the rights in warranty conferred by the original lease. Extrinsic
evidence purporting to show that the parties had only intended to
lease the interest of the defendant in the property was admitted
in the lower court. However, the court of appeal refused to con-
sider it, stating that "it is not within the competence of this
court to determine their [the parties'] intent extrinsically since
no plea of mutual error or fraud was made and since the lease is
not ambiguous. '3 7
The court also notes in this case, as in Robichaux v. Pool,38
that it "is well settled that the assignment of a lease is a sale of
a real right," citing R.S. 9:1105. In context, the statement is
proper, but as in the Robichaux case, one should beware of ac-
cepting the statement in its full, literal sense.
Surface Damages
Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.39 presented a rather un-
usual claim for surface damages. Defendant lessee took a mineral
lease from the owner of certain land, which lease was properly
recorded. The clause of the lease which customarily provides for
payment by lessee for damages "to timber and growing crops
of lessor" was amended by striking out the reference to "timber
and growing crops." Prior to the execution of the mineral lease,
the landowner had entered into an oral lease with plaintiff look-
ing toward the use of the surface of the land for farming on a
crop-sharing basis. Defendant's operations allegedly caused dam-
age to the crops o plaintiff, the surface lessee. The court held that
defendant could not be held liable to plaintiff for damage to
crops because under the circumstances defendant was entitled
37. Berwick Mud Co. v. Stansbury, 205 So.2d 147, 150 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968).
38. 209 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
39. 208 So.2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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to assume that the growing crops were those of the landowner.
Further, the lease exonerated defendant from such damages, and,
finally, defendant had paid the landowner $125.00 and secured a
release from damages to the surface. The court noted that plain-
tiff had abandoned all claims against the landowner for breach
of the lessor's warranty of peaceful possession, and, therefore,
it did not determine whether plaintiff would have been entitled
to recover from his lessor.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Much of the litigation before the courts during the last term
involved, as usual, claims against insurers.
The following comments deal with some of the cases which
presented significant issues of law relating to the insurance con-
tract.
In Graves v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.' the First Circuit Court
of Appeal followed the view of the Third expressed in two
earlier cases2 and held mutually repugnant an escape clause in a
garage liability policy and an excess clause in an automobile
policy held by an individual. The vehicle involved in the accident
was owned by an automobile sales agency but was being operated
by a person to whom the agency had lent it for use while his own
vehicle was being repaired. The policy carried by the sales
agency, the garage liability policy, covered the car. In addition,
the driver was covered under the provisions of a policy carried
by him on the vehicle being repaired. The protection afforded
by the garage policy applied "if no other valid and collectible
insurance either primary or excess" was available. The protec-
tion provided for the driver under his own policy while oper-
ating a vehicle not owned by him was declared to be "excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and "found no reason to
depart from the solution" arrived at by the lower courts and
followed their view that the excess and escape clauses in the
two policies were "mutually repugnant and ineffective." Per-
haps much could be said in favor of the consistency which is
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 200 So.2d 67 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
2. Lincombe v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 920 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d
750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
